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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SUMMIT MEETING EXAMINES FRANCE'S ROLE ON CONTINENT

Mitterrand's Policies for Africa

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 18, 19

[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet: "What Mitterrand Contributes to Africa"]

[Text] A certain sensitivity and a political determination to promote "real" development.

"The French have ideas and they are often good ideas. But when it comes to putting them into practice, that is an entirely different matter!" The irony of this statement by an American diplomat is not without foundation. Last month, at Cancun, I saw Francois Mitterrand plead sincerely for the Third World. He made credible proposals in the matter of North-South solidarity. But without any great results (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087). Before that, in Mexico, I had heard the French president issue an appeal for liberty in Latin America. That was not without importance either. But, considering France's influence in this region, one may doubt the effectiveness of such remarks.

In short, in less than a week, the weakness of new French diplomacy came to light. What good is an innovative policy if the means for implementing it are insufficient? But this skepticism perhaps is out of place when it comes to Africa.

If there is one region where the generous but just the same realistic ideas of socialist France have a good chance of being translated into action, that is Africa. History, common language (in a part of Africa), and economic interests, to be sure, give French diplomacy here a significance entirely different from what it is elsewhere. But that is not enough. After all, Giscard also had ideas. His 7-year term nevertheless ended with not much in the way of results.

The thing that strengthens France's position today is a certain African "sensitivity" on the part of the socialist administration. Pierre Moussa, a man who had been rather badly treated by those same socialists, recalled that rather deservedly in these columns several weeks ago in connection with Gaston Defferre, Claude Cheysson, and Francois Mitterrand (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1086). This sensitivity by the way was expressed on 3 November at the opening of the Paris conference: "By identifying a phase of my life with that of your continent, I learned that Africa

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was not really known and understood except by the Africans themselves." It was not the arrogant Giscard who said that! Mitterrand himself was talking about the "great humility" deriving from his interest in Africa. But these are just words. This time however they strike home because they are true.

Giscard, we remember, was on bad terms with Houphouet. Mitterrand himself, hailing those of his peers "who were (his) colleagues in the French parliamentary assemblies," paid "friendly homage" to the Ivorian head of state, "your dean, my friend, (who) is quite familiar with what all of these memories can bring out in the way of communion of ideas, common struggle, solidarity, and friendship." In the meantime, while the French president reviewed priority topics, a religion and a crusade against the "international speculators," was undoubtedly launched upon the instigation of Houphouet.

It is not by chance that the French Socialists, after 6 months in power, managed to restore a climate of confidence with the majority of the Africans. With these "progressives" who bothered Giscard so much, with certain "moderates" whom he had bothered, with all those, finally, who not without worry were wondering sometime about the consequences of the victory of the left. From Jean-Pierre Cot to Guy Penne, numerous French diplomats traveled all over the continent (see the article by Sennen Andriamirado, below). Mitterrand received many African chiefs of state at Elysee Palace; Houphouet was the first and Mobutu was the last. France was there when a friendly country seemed threatened, such as Cameroon, by its powerful Nigerian neighbor. In short, the socialist president reassured everyone. And, in receiving his guests in Paris, he wanted the conference to reassure those who were still unsure.

With confidence restored, Mitterrand took the initiative. However, he preferred a more subtle and cautious approach over the interventionism of Giscard, a kind of double or nothing which succeeded (Shaba) or failed (Chad). He was more respectful of appearances if not principles, he was more legalistic in any case, and he relied heavily on the OAU. Regarding the Sahara, for example, France supports the Nairobi II resolution. Even more so regarding Chad. Was the OAU powerless to dislodge the Libyans? Mitterrand's action, shielded by the pan-African organization, today seems capable of putting an end to the designs of Qadhdhafi (see the article by Sennen Andriamirado and Francois Soudan, below). At other times, people would have been shouting "interference." But the way it is done means much here. And also the fact that the new-look socialists a priori are cleansed of any suspicion of neocolonialism.

In the beginning, the attitude of Paris, a powerful idea shared by a number of African capitals, was this: Regional conflicts and local power appetites open the door to an East-West confrontation which is not good for the poor countries. The latter primarily were concerned with pressing problems of development.

On that level, socialist France proposed to act by stepping up its aid most of which goes to Africa. Commitments were made: The total amount of development aid would be increased from 0.35 percent to 0.7 percent of the GNP between now and 1988 and the share reserved for the least advanced countries would be increased to 0.15 percent between now and 1985.

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The Socialists want to promote a certain type of development. Mitterrand was very clear on that in Paris: "If France commits itself to the job of considerably stepping up its aid, it also wants to guide its logic along these lines. The solution to the drama of underdevelopment does not involve the establishment of export crops or industries based on inadequate technologies oriented exclusively toward the market of the developing countries. To this kind of merchant capitalism we must prefer a kind of agricultural and industrial development that will utilize the human and natural resources, seeking to satisfy the essential needs of the population on a priority basis." Does this kind of approach indicate a desire to interfere in affairs of other countries? It is essentially a matter of good common sense and recalls the spirit of the Lagos plan adopted by the OAU in 1980.

Does this mean that the daddy-style of cooperation has been buried? One can only hope so. "I am minister of cooperation and development," Jean-Pierre Cot emphasized on the eve of the Paris summit in his office on Monsieur Street. "It is the second term (development) in my demand which justifies my action." "Self-centered" development, with priority going to rural areas, plus "integrated" programs. Cot seems to believe in that, quite happy to be addressing himself to his task "without so far having received any guidance from Elysee Palace, telling me to do this or that or the other thing." Of course, for the time being, he must finance aid projects which fit in rather poorly with his philosophy and he must give emergency aid. But he intends to go into "real" development soon.

The French are not wrong in emphasizing this point which is essentially in Africa today. Just as they were not wrong to insist on freedoms in Latin America where the economy is already more structured. To each his own priority. Having made this point, the right for democracy is no less urgent in Africa. Now, in spite of the new reference to the "people," it seems to have been tragically forgotten in France's African diplomacy. It would be a shame if realism were to prevail over generosity here. Unless this generosity is preserved for those who can only expect words from France. Realism is good for the others, that is, the Africans.

Socialist Administration, Party Misunderstandings

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 20-22

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Two Sides"]

[Text] The socialist administration has its reasons which the Socialist Party does not understand.

In Africa, the French administration and the French PS [Socialist Party] have four categories of "common friends": The leaders of Benin, of the Congo, of Niger, and of Senegal. And that is all. This at least is what emerges from a comparison among the guests invited by Mr Francois Mitterrand to the so-called French-African summit in Paris (3-5 November) and those invited by the party--from which the French president came--to the Congress of Valence (23-25 October, see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087).

The other invited guests on either side are not the same. It just so happens that the PS administers its friendships in a manner different from the administration.

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In summary, the French are applying a new axiom; "The friends of our friends are not our friends!" The theorem even works the other way since the "enemies of our friends are not our enemies." Thus, African leaders ignored by the PS are among the guests invited by the government. This is of course the way it had to be for reasons of state: France maintains relations with states, not with parties.

Comorian president Ahmed Abdallah Abderrahman can consider himself the most fortunate: Although his regime is considered "illegal" by the PS, he was the only African received twice in 2 days by Francois Mitterrand. Other leaders who, among the party comrades, are told that their methods of government are not appreciated, came out of Elysee Palace, their heads held high. That is true of the Togolese Gnassingbe Eyadema, the Zairian Mobutu Sese Seko, and above all the Gabonese Omar Bongo, who even managed to turn the situation around.

It is Omar Bongo who, during 5 months, received the largest number of French personalities. In particular, Mr Guy Penne, presidential advisor on African affairs, in June, August, and October. More than that, the Gabonese chief of state can claim credit as conciliator since it was he who, in his own Libreville, organized the meetings between Guy Penne and the controversial leaders, such as the Chadian Goukouni Weddeye and the Central African Gen Andre Kolingba. In French socialist circles, Guy Penne was discreetly reproached for having manifested a certain predilection for Omar Bongo, something which Valery Giscard d'Estaing was hardly ever criticized for. The people at Elysee Palace are content with saying: "Our only mistake in Gabon was not to have recalled ambassador Maurice Robert soon enough."

In reality, there is a noticeable disparity between the criteria adopted by the two power centers. The socialist militants would have preferred to enlarge the Front Line countries to include the "French-African family" inherited from Giscard. That was undoubtedly too soon. But one must not forget that the African policy statements by candidate Francois Mitterrand quite correctly labeled unhealthy "French aid concentrated on a limited number of countries, most of which were our colonies." This is explained as follows at Elysee Palace today: "Mitterrand could not suddenly break with tradition."

Another basic assertion from the PS seems to have been forgotten by the administration. It was emphasized that French cooperation would not be extended to "the racist regimes (that is to say, South Africa) and those in which attacks upon human rights in some way constitute a principle of government."

After having become minister of cooperation and development, Jean-Pierre Cot kept saying, in an official brochure ("La France et le Tiers monde," Paris, Diloutremer publishers, 4th quarter, 1981) that "France can no longer be an active or passive accomplice of crimes which it has tolerated far too long or a slanted concept of noninterference." This is a logical conclusion; none of the guests invited to Elysee Palace were ever suspected of attacking human rights.

Beyond the friendship expressed on either side, there is, on principle, a search for coherence between the professions of faith and action. But that is not always discovered.

What about French military bases in Africa? While in the opposition, the socialists condemned them. But, even before Francois Mitterrand was elected, the only phrase

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taken out of the Socialist Party's African Program concerned the bases in question: "Their existence can be justified only in terms of extreme necessity and in a temporary fashion." It would thus be necessary to consider that the military support bases in Central Africa, in the Comoro Islands (Mayotte), in Ivory Coast, at Jibuti, in Gabon, and in Senegal all depend on "dire necessity." The truth is that, while in the opposition, it was easy to demand that they be dismantled. Once in power, it is more difficult to close those bases down. The state has its reasons which the party has nothing to do with.

A similar finding applies to other fields. Thus, the PS proclaimed noninterference in the affairs of others and affirms that defense agreements must only be aimed at the protection of state against foreign threats. This principle was apparently implemented in Central Africa; French soldiers were withdrawn from the personal guard of David Dacko and allowed him to be "toppled" by General Kolingba. For Chad, on the other hand, the party had violently criticized military aid given by France to the successive regimes of Francois Tombalbaye and Felix Malloum. But today Paris flies to the aid of Goukouni Weddeye.

Of course, the foreign threat does exist; with respect to Chad, it is already there; it is the threat from Libya. Of course, the shipment of weapons to Goukouni was deliberately ordered to prevent any attempt at a coup d'etat; according to all evidence, however, the coup, which Paris had been afraid of, was not carried out by Qadhdhafi but rather by a Chadian who was one of his friends. That therefore would seem to be an internal Chadian affair. And Mitterrand avoided having to admit that.

Looking at Chad, the French president moreover forgot other principles of his party. To a certain degree, for example, strict respect which must govern French-African relations. By sending out a telegram to invite the current president of the OAU, the Kenyan Daniel Arap Moi, without delay to send an inter-African force to Chad, he aroused perceptible ill will in several capitals on the continent. The diplomatic formulas, employed here and there, might rather roughly be summarized as follows: "What is Mitterrand sticking his nose into?" In Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, and in Gabon, Omar Bongo, continue to maintain that this kind of inter-African force should be put together with the help of the UN. The meaning behind that is: "It is not up to France to push us!" The same tune came from Algeria where there is only friendship for Mitterrand.

As for OAU secretary-general Edem Kodjo, he felt that French aid to the Pan-African force for Chad would have to be based on bilateral agreements between France and the countries to participate in that force. Put less diplomatically, it sounds like this: "Let those who want to ask for French aid do so individually. The OAU, which is a continental organization, does not deal with a single country, except France."

The injunction of Francois Mitterrand thus becomes a flagrant incursion in the affairs of the OAU. Elysee Palace at least is guilty of lack of discretion. For having sent his message from Cancun (Mexico, see JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087). Did he want in this way to tell the world that he, that is to say, France, can directly speak to all of Africa? "Valery Giscard d'Estaing would not have done better," African diplomats note with irony.

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In summary, nothing has changed fundamentally in France's approach to its relations with Africa. And it is perhaps this issue on which the party and the administration do not disagree by a single iota. The premier proclaimed quite sincerely: "Among the three major portions of the Third World, Africa is the one where, for historical and geographical reasons, has been most present; this presence today is essential for our country's international clout; it is not negligible with respect to its economy." This is why Francois Mitterrand cannot really drop the idea of regularly--and by himself--meeting with half of Africa.

Africa Without Tears

The grand prize for doing the most traveling goes to Guy Penne. In less than 6 days (4-10 August 1981), the French president's advisor for African affairs visited eight countries: Niger, Benin, Gabon, the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Jibuti.

Another award, for the largest number of African countries visited, also goes to Guy Penne: 17, total, between June and October.

The third award, the award for loyalty, must be given to Guy Penne: In 4 months, he was received in Gabon by President Omar Bongo on three occasions. That of course was part of his duty because the successor--although he does not like the comparison--of Jacques Foccart, Rene Journiac, and Martin Kirsch, in Africa, is both the most mysterious and the most visible French official. Believed to know everything and to be able to do everything, Guy Penne does not go unnoticed anywhere because his conversation partners are happy to report his presence.

Less mythical, Cooperation and Development Minister Jean-Pierre Cot did not put in the same performance as his comrade in the Socialist Party. He was only able to "make" five countries in Africa: Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal (3-16 August), the Congo, Nigeria (15-22 August). It is also noted that this balance was carefully worked out between West Africa and Central Africa, between the French-speaking countries and the English-speaking countries.

This dosage did not inspire Regis Debray, a mission chief at Elysee Palace. Loyal to his guerrilla past, the companion of Che Guevara in Bolivia above all visited the "revolutionary" countries in Africa, such as Angola and Mozambique, and his presence at other airports was only due to necessary stopovers.

French personalities carefully avoided certain countries. That was true of Michel Jobert, minister of foreign trade, and Gaston Defferre, minister of interior, who only went to Algiers to settle some very specific issues. Foreign relations minister Claude Cheysson did better although he did limit his trips to the Maghreb: Tunis (5-6 July), Algiers and Rabat (8-10 August), and once again Rabat, during the meeting of the French-African Commission. The chief diplomat however did not neglect Africa south of the Sahara since he very discreetly dispatched the roving ambassador Jean-Pierre Campredon to Kenya and to the Sudan and even more discreetly to certain hot spots in Central Africa.

This discretion only helped the African trips of the ninth French personality, Edwige Avice, minister of youth and sports, who, between 17 and 22 October, made a

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"sporting" trip to Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Mali. All the way to Mopti, Sangha, and Tombouctou, towns where sports activities as we know are confined to tourist antics. (S.A.)

How Much Does Africa Cost

Modesty? Perfidy toward the Giscard regime? The French ministers of foreign relations and of cooperation, on the occasion of the eighth French-African summit, published a nice little booklet of about 30 pages entitled "La France et le Tiers monde" (Paris, Diloutremer Publishers, 4th Quarter, 1981). The principal statistics of French aid in 1980 are contained in that publication.

These are statistics of dazzling modesty. Last year, France devoted barely 0.36 percent of its GNP (in other words, \$2,358,000,000) for public international aid to the Third World. The portion allocated to the 30 least advanced countries (the PMA [Least Advanced Countries] which met in Paris between 1 and 14 September) did not exceed 0.06 percent (\$243 million). In terms of the ratio between aid and GNP, France is thus in ninth place among OECD countries and it is in seventh place in Europe, far behind Holland (0.99 percent), Norway (0.82 percent), Sweden (0.76 percent), and Denmark (0.72 percent). In terms of absolute value, the situation is not as bad with France holding fourth place after the United States (\$7,091,000,000), West Germany (\$3,518,000,000), and Japan (\$3,304,000,000).

What is usually called aid to the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories] being excluded here (\$1,687,000,000), we distinguish between bilateral aid (\$1,645,000,000 or 70 percent of the total) and multilateral aid (\$713,000,000).

The former figure is broken down into \$903 million for technical and cultural cooperation (55 percent), \$611 million for investments (37 percent), and \$131 million in the economic and financial area.

Concerning the second item, \$428 million are channeled through the EEC, especially the FED (European Development Fund with \$268 million), the BEI (European Investment Bank), food aid, with \$167 million for the group of the World Bank (AID, IFC); \$62 million for the regional banks and \$56 million for the institutions of the UN (UNDP, FAD, etc.).

France's position is better in the matter of technical cooperation. It has 27,000 citizens working in Africa, including 15,000 in the three countries of the Maghreb and 12,000 in the area south of the Sahara. Moreover, two-thirds of them are teachers and county agents. France also finances about 23,000 scholarships for study and training courses either in the countries themselves or in the old home country.

Several delegations to the summit in Paris carefully kept that little pamphlet. Who knows? Some day it might be useful. (A.D.)

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Mitterrand Speaks 'African Language'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 p 23

[Letter by Sennen Andriamirado: "Letter to My Brother"]

[Text] "Did you know that our president was also a socialist?"

I have some big news for you: French president Francois Mitterrand speaks African! Of course, neither Lingala, nor Bambara, nor even Ivorian French--you know, where they drop all the articles--but his speech was well understood by our own president. He passed his final exam the moment he said at the opening of their summit: "I have learned that Africa was not really known and understood except by the Africans themselves."

With your usual bad mood, you are going to tell me that this is demagoguery. Still, it works: We, the Africans, are ready to listen to the whites who tell us things like that.

This is perhaps why so many of our leaders went to Paris to attend this summit which is no longer called "French-African" but rather "conference of the chiefs of state of Africa and France." There were almost 20 presidents plus their vice presidents and ministers.

Overall, about 30 countries were represented, the newspapers tell me. So you know what that means! Half of Africa gathered around a single non-African: Francois Mitterrand. That gives me an idea: If you want a taxi license, a scholarship, or a passport, instead of going to see all those bureaucrats who take your money (which you do not have anyway), without taking you to the president, all you have to do is write to this fellow Mitterrand. They say he is very kind because he is a socialist.

By the way, did you know that our president was also a socialist? I did not know that. Mitterrand did not know it either! Perhaps you, the young people, you understand this, but I was astonished to hear our boss say that he always had ideas like those of the French socialists. Why should he say that now? In the old days, with Giscard, we were an "advanced liberal" country. With Mitterrand, we became "socialists." Of course, nobody sang the International but the tone of most of the speeches was socialist. While all of this bothers me in terms of my dignity as an African (changing opinions like changing a partner is not very glorious), this conversion of our presidents to socialism is good for us: Perhaps human rights will now be respected among us. At least Mitterrand will have rendered us a service.

You will ask me whether I have seen all of our presidents. No, because that is difficult and, because to keep up with them, you are not traveling in the forest or in the prairie. They rode in fancy cars with many cops around and you, in Paris, can only take the subway. That is normal. And besides, they were not all in the same place. Houphouet lived in his own place, in a suburb of Paris. Mobutu lived in his apartment on Foch Avenue. Eyadema stayed in his residence on Marechal-Monory Avenue. The others stayed at the Crillon, a palace. It cost very much but France paid the bill.

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As I know you only too well, you are going to say; "Why did our presidents live in hotels as luxurious as those?" I will reply to you in advance; Where would you have them stay instead? Would you have wanted them to stay in a camp at the foot of the Eiffel Tower and to get around Paris on foot or on the back of a camel? I tell you, my dear friends, you have to go along with the trends; let us not be nasty to our chiefs of state. After all, when other presidents come to visit us, to our countries, we do not have them sleep out in the streets. We offer them dignified residences. Just like at home: You give the passing stranger the biggest room and the cleanest bed.

On the other hand, I want you to note one thing: Send me the text of the statement of the president upon his return to the country. There will certainly be comments on the radio or in the newspapers on the Paris summit. Send me that. I will tell you whether he said what really happened here.

With that, I leave you. Take care, my friends. Translate my letter to your mother. Tell her that France has changed, perhaps, but only for the French. Because between France and us, there is always the same ocean, the same desert, the same forest. Tell her also that, if all of this is to change, it is not because Mitterrand will do the job. Our president will do it.

Tell your mother that, for the moment, we are still the hand that is held out and received. In other words, the hand that is beneath the hand that gives.

As ever yours,

Sennen

PS. Also tell your mother that I will send her a little money order at the end of the month. But I do not know whether the post office will be able to pay her; they say that there is no more money. Is that true?

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ANGOLA

SHORTFALL IN COFFEE PRODUCTION POINTS TO MOUNTING DIFFICULTIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2841

[Excerpt] Following independence, the large coffee plantations were seized and integrated into national holdings, but the inexperience of those to whom they were entrusted and the lack of organization caused a vertical drop in production reported not long ago by the director of the company in charge of the coffee sector, ENCAFE [National Coffee Company].

The sixth coffee harvest since independence, beginning in June, did not enjoy good conditions: scarcity of food products for workers since February, delays in the payment of wages and transport difficulties.

Provincial ENCAFE officials in Cuanza-North supervise 409 plantations, spread out over 11 cantons, whose harvest was far from meeting planned production objectives. Some 29,000 persons work on these coffee plantations, including 12,000 permanent laborers and the rest seasonal workers who are not employed six days a week. The rate of absenteeism is high: Poorly nourished and badly paid, workers prefer to devote their time to their own plots of land that enable them to achieve a subsistence living for themselves and their families.

Workers are taken to their work areas by ENCAFE transportation, but the company's vehicle pool is only half used because of constant breakdowns. As for the firm's 60 tractors, many have been paralyzed because of the lack of spare parts. Shipping the coffee out after the harvest was difficult because of the lack of trucks and the poor condition of access roads, which should have been maintained by the provincial delegation of the Ministry of Construction (the only organization that has graders). However, it demanded previous payment for work and ENCAFE did not have the necessary funds.

After the drying of the coffee berries, it became apparent that there were not enough shellers, again because of the shortage of spare parts needed to repair existing equipment. The coffee therefore piled up in the warehouses in August.

In addition to government plantations, there are many small production units in Cuanza-North belonging to private parties or cooperatives. Poorly organized, this production sector is no more motivated and tends to give up coffee growing for other crops, especially because delays in payment are frequent. Coffee from the 1980-1981 harvest did not begin to be marketed domestically until between December 1980 and February 1981, and its shipping required much longer.

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Finally, nature was merciless. Because of inadequate rainfall, coffee trees are dying out in the cantons of Cazengo, Bolongongo, Golungo-Alto, Gonguembo and Pango-Aluquem. Foreign experts have come to study the situation to see whether it is possible to remedy it.

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ANGOLA

ANALYSIS OF MAIN STATE MARKETING COMPANY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2779

[Text] The National Company for the Purchase and Distribution of Agricultural Products, more widely known as ENCODIPA, marketed nearly 194,000 tons of products last year and 150 million kwanzas worth of miscellaneous goods.

Its activity covers all of Angola. The enterprise has branches in the country's 18 provinces. It is established in 143 cantons and 408 communes. It is also involved in traveling sales in rural areas based on a previously set schedule, which is not without problems because ENCODIPA's visits to rural markets are awaited by the people, even if it has few or no industrial goods to offer them.

The deliveries of these industrial goods are often a problem for enterprise officials when they do not come at the proper time -- that is, harvest time: June to October for dry products (corn, beans, and so on) and May to August for vegetables from the Wako-Kungo and Benguele region.

Despite its broad decentralization, ENCODIPA's warehouses are located in Luanda: for cotton, grain (in the facilities of the former Gremio do Milho) and goods, as well as for spare parts and accessories needed for the activities of the enterprise.

These activities involve the purchase and distribution of agricultural products and cover various sectors, one of which is the primary processing of certain products before consumption: rice husking and polishing, milling, baling and classification of cotton, preparation of tobacco.

Another important activity of ENCODIPA is that linked to seed. One department is in fact specifically assigned to the task: purchasing of imported seed, selection of lots marketed that should be grown again, separation and processing of such lots.

Regarding produce and fruits, ENCODIPA uses the services of firms in the private sector and a number of government domestic trade establishments. It also handles marketing, preservation, handling and the distribution of these products and has an establishment for their direct sale to the people. This is a store located in the facilities of the old COFA [expansion unknown], open from Thursday to Sunday and able to serve 1,500 persons a day during the week (including members of the party, the government and the diplomatic corps accredited in Angola) and 200 persons on Sunday.

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Special attention is given to the cashew sector. This is a crop grown in several areas of Angola. There are plans for construction of a small plant to produce juice from the false fruit of the cashew tree, juice that would be kept in barrels and shipped to a bottling facility. Cashew nuts would be shipped to airport shops exempt from customs duties.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

FRENCH COOPERATION PROSPECTS--The problem that was at the heart of French-Angolan discussions was the strengthening of relations between Paris and Luanda. These relations have been improving steadily, Luis de Almeida, Angolan ambassador to Paris, said recently, while Guy Penne, adviser to Francois Mitterrand, stated, on a visit to Angola in August, that the "French leftist union government wanted to have even more privileged relations" with Marxist-Leninist Angola. The French Government intends to further the cooperation begun several years ago, particularly in the areas of oil, machinery, coffee and fishing. Economic relations are clearly better. The French company ELF-Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France], which has been doing exploratory drilling since May off the coast of northern Angola, last week announced the discovery of oil, adding that the first tests point to remarkable productivity. Total also began last month to explore for oil in an offshore sector entrusted to it further south. A contract for over 150 million francs for construction of a textile plant in Luanda should soon be signed with a consortium headed by Creusot-Loire, which has already built such a complex in Benguele in southwestern Angola. Finally, the French Electric Company is to participate in the establishment of an electricity institute near Luanda. Commercial trade between France and Angola, totaling 400 million French francs in 1980, should show an increase in 1981, with contracts for some 1 billion francs signed last year between Angola and French companies. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2711] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

LUANDA MASTER PLAN--A long-term master plan for the city of Luanda is going to be carried out. The matter, which has been studied by the Ministry of Planning, will be the subject of a project whose drafting will take 3 years because of its complexity and the anarchic growth of the city because of population growth. Various foreign firms have been asked for bids from the following countries: Portugal, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Brazil, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden and Denmark. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1876, 23 Oct 81 p 2711] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

JAPANESE RICE DONATION--Japan has given Cape Verde a gift worth 260 million yen (about 5 million French francs) for the purchase of 1,250 tons of rice, it was learned on 15 October. Last year, the Japanese Government gave Cape Verde food aid for the purchase of 2,600 tons of American wheat. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2755] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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CHAD

ARTICLE SEES SETTING UP INTER-AFRICAN FORCE MORE URGENT THAN EVER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2797

[Text] The announcement by the Libyans of the withdrawal of their troops from Chad at a very time when the president of France was meeting in Paris with the representatives of some 30 African countries, including some 20 chiefs of state, is the crowning of intense diplomatic activity accompanied by a series of rumors of a coup d'etat against President Goukouni Oueddei, rumors immediately denied but which could look like the elements of a maneuver whose purpose seems uncertain, depending on whether one attributes responsibility for it to elements inside or outside Chad.

The event that set off the tumult was the telegram sent from Cancun by the president of France to the president of the OAU, asking him to speed up the sending of the inter-African force to Chad. The presence in Cancun of the President of the United States and of hundreds of representatives of the world press naturally gave a special edge to this initiative, which reminded the international community of the existence of the Chadian problem and all its projections, in Africa itself as well as in the Near East, where the situation created by the disappearance of President Sadat does not leave the great powers indifferent. The telegram was motivated by information, deemed to be alarming, from Ndjamen, where President Goukouni Oueddei was being pressured by Colonel Qadhdhafi to hasten the merger between Libya and Chad.

Francois Mitterrand's telegram was one more confirmation of the French policy on Chad: supporting OAU decisions made in Nairobi with all his strength, and consequently, supporting the legitimate government of Chad and helping the establishment of the inter-African force, which was to make the withdrawal of Libyan troops possible. The only limitation that the Paris government placed on its assistance was the sending of French troops.

France's affirmed support and the warning sent to Colonel Qadhdhafi, represented by the sending of 25 tons of munitions and light weapons to the Chadian Army, strengthened the authority of President Goukouni Oueddei and encouraged him in his decision to call upon Colonel Qadhdhafi, in a message dated 29 October, to immediately withdraw his troops from Ndjamen and from Chari-Baguirmi Province and from the entire Chadian territory by 31 December.

President Goukouni Oueddei's personal position was not in fact as assured as it may have at first appeared. Within the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT), Oueddei's policy was disputed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmat Acyl, whose ethnic base in northern Chad, far more substantial than that of the head of GUNT, might cause him to try to take over the leadership of the country.

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Oueddei's very legitimacy is questioned by some African chiefs of state. At a press conference in Paris, the Togolese president, General Eyadema, gave decisions of the Nairobi OAU summit conference an interpretation different from that of Paris. According to Eyadema, the OAU's support for the principles of settlement worked out by Chad's neighbors at the Lagos and Lome conferences, including the establishment of an inter-African force and the withdrawal of Libyan troops, in no way constitutes an extension or renewal of Oueddei's mandate, a mandate that expired in February. Consequently, the latter allegedly has no justification for trying to continue to remain at the head of GUNT and it should only be up to the OAU "committee of the 12) to make a ruling on the point.

In requiring that Tripoli withdraw its troops, Oueddei thereby accepted a challenge on which his political survival depended. However, he seems to have first carefully weighed all his trump cards.

The inter-African force now seems on the way to being effectively set up. Two countries have pledged to send contingents: Nigeria, 2,000 men, and Senegal, 500 to 600 men. Others, like Algeria and Egypt, have promised logistical support and the president of the OAU says he is sure that the replacement of Libyan troops by the inter-African force throughout the Chadian territory could be assured before the end of the year.

Furthermore, Oueddei could speculate on Qadhdhafi's desire to have the next OAU summit conference in Tripoli and become president. The Libyan colonel, who sees himself as the successor to Nasser and the liberator of peoples, could hardly allow his troops to look like an army of occupation on 31 December, or go back on his word to withdraw them whenever the legitimate government of Chad asked him to do so. The presence in Paris of over half of the African nations, including a number of Arab countries, may have made him fear the consequences of his diplomatic isolation when he would have to confront the hostility of the United States, which supports the French position on the question. Moreover, it is likely that Qadhdhafi, who considers Chad, where he has been able to rally supporters, as a natural extension of his country, might hope to maintain his influence there, even continue to control it by means other than military.

Finally, Hissein Habre, spontaneously or following pressure put upon him by the countries that support him -- particularly Sudan, into whose territory he withdrew his army -- said that he had suspended all military activity until Tripoli's response were known to the request for the withdrawal of its troops. The essential condition for the departure of the troops -- that is, the maintenance of security throughout Libyan [sic] territory -- now seems to have been fulfilled.

Qadhdhafi appears to have yielded to all these reasons. The commanding officer of the Libyan troops in Chad told newsmen in Ndjamena on 3 November that he had received a telephone call from Qadhdhafi ordering him to send his contingents home within 2 or 3 days, without stating that it was a total withdrawal from Chadian territory or merely from Ndjamena. He used the pretext of military secrecy to refuse to say how many troops were involved -- Westerners put the number at 10,000, which would seem to preclude their evacuation with equipment in such a short amount of time. It did not appear at that time that GUNT had been officially informed of Qadhdhafi's decision.

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If this is not a mere tactical maneuver on the part of Qadhdhafi, an important step will have been taken toward the normalization of Chad and Oueddei's authority will emerge considerably strengthened. But serious problems will have to be solved, the least of which is not the reconciliation of all Chadian factions.

Before leaving Ndjamea to join Oueddei in Paris, Ahmat Acyl confirmed his total opposition to the withdrawal of Libyan troops, which he views as premature inasmuch as the composition, date of arrival and mission of the inter-African force have not been determined. He believes that "the seeds of civil war" are still present in Chad and that "the domestic situation (there) is more fragile than generally admitted."

The pitched battles in Mongo and Dourboli in mid October between the troops of Minister of Interior Mahama Abba and those of the minister of foreign affairs seem to justify these remarks. Oueddei has understood the danger and his government has just announced the creation of a special commission in charge of determining responsibilities in confrontations between the various Chadian military factions. Those responsible will be brought before a military court.

If foreign aid for the reconstruction of Chad, especially that of France, is not arranged, nothing can still be done as long as there is not a national union of all factions, and the deployment of the inter-African force appears more urgent than ever if the withdrawal of Libyan troops is effective.

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CHAD

BACKGROUND OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIBYAN FORCES FROM CHAD

Reported Libyan Coup

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 12-14

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Story of an Imagined Coup d'Etat"]

[Text] Why Paris believed for 24 hours that there had been a changing of the guard in Ndjamenä.

About half a score of lines in a speech covering 13 sheets, barely 40 seconds--that is rather little for Chad. Even though the speech was delivered slowly by Francois Mitterrand on Tuesday, 3 November, at the opening of the French-African summit in Paris before a score of attentive heads of state, this was after all nothing but a rather scholarly presentation. It was about the gravel at Tibesti and the cotton fields of Logone, about Hissein Habre, about Goukouni Weddeye, and about Qadhdhafi: There was hardly any more talk about that on Kleber Avenue. In any case, nothing more than the prices of cocoa or the Namibian issue. Officially at least. In the well-appointed hallways of the Conference Center, even before the announcement of the Libyan withdrawal, nobody had forgotten that a week ago a crazy rumor was making the rounds in Paris, coming from press agencies and newspaper editorial offices: A Coup d'Etat in Ndjamenä.

This deliberate desire to play the Chadian affair down, to reducing it to the proportions of a simple incident, is an accurate reflection of the atmosphere of drama which prevailed for a month in a square whose corners are called Kousseri, Tripoli, Paris, and Cancun. Is this the story of a manipulation or is it history? Both of them, it seems. It all began on 17 and 18 September, during the visit of Goukouni Weddeye to Francois Mitterrand. With his puny adolescent voice, his salt-and-pepper goatee, the Chadian president was complaining of "pressing pressure" (sic) to which he is exposed from Qadhdhafi.

Goukouni is worried; in a rather funereal position for several months, between the "southerners" of Kamougue, viscerally anti-Libyan, and the men in his foreign ministry, with Acyl Ahmat, very close to Tripoli, not at all sure of his own forces--the FAP (People's Armed Forces), with their rather relative discipline, he is simply afraid that it might all collapse. He was listened to and understood at Elysee Palace; economic aid would be stepped up and the establishment of an inter-African force would be encouraged.

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Saturday, 17 October: While Goukouni returned to Ndjamenas after a month, Francois Mitterrand went to the United States, as the first stage of a long journey which is to bring him to Mexico for the Cancun summit. Upon his return he undoubtedly expects once again to take up the Chadian issue. Jean-Pierre Cot, minister of cooperation, who was in charge of the Chad affair, and Claude Cheysson, minister of foreign relations, were included in his delegation. That was when quite abruptly everything went the other way. One telegram and then two more arrived in Paris, at Quai d'Orsay [foreign office], starting on the next day, Tuesday, 20 October. They were signed by Pierre Ricard, head of the diplomatic mission in Kousseri. Located opposite Ndjamenas, on the Cameroon bank of the Chari river, Kousseri--where there are still hundreds of refugees--is marking time, awaiting the reconstruction of Ndjamenas and its telecommunications network from the half-capital of Chad. And Pierre Ricard, ambassador of France.

"Things are going badly," the chief of missions wrote in his three messages "strictly for office use only." He added in substance: The men of Goukouni are in the process of being eliminated; Acyl Ahmat wants power; Goukouni himself could be overthrown before the French-African summit. Big confusion in Paris. As a matter of fact, in addition to his own personal analysis of the situation, Pierre Ricard in his telegrams transmitted the proposals of Goukouni Weddeye, whom he met the day before, on 19 October.

Knowing that his words would be passed on, did the Chadian president push things and force Paris into clearly supporting him by dramatizing a situation that had already been defused? Was he "bluffing" when he mentioned to his conversation partner the imminence of a Libyan coup d'etat?

In the absence of any effective way to check on events in Ndjamenas, the alarmist telegrams from Pierre Ricard were received with much worry. Especially since Goukouni took care to send a small delegation rather discreetly to Paris to confirm the messages of the French ambassador.

Several thousand kilometers away, on the other side of the Atlantic, there was feverish activity among the French officials who came with President Mitterrand to Cancun. Forwarded to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, the telegrams from Kousseri had the effect of a bomb: It was necessary to act quickly. On Thursday, 22 October, early in the afternoon (in other words, in the evening as far as Paris and Ndjamenas are concerned), Mitterrand published a statement as to the "urgency" of dispatching the inter-African force to Chad (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1087). Pressed with questions, Jean-Pierre Cot wound up saying that the situation was serious. On Saturday, 24 October, in the morning, Mitterrand, Cheysson, and Cot and the others returned to Paris.

In Tripoli, what is now called the "Cancun declaration" was received in total silence: Not a line in the press, not a word on radio, not a picture on television. As if it had not been a surprise. On 26 October, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi summoned French ambassador Charles Malo to whom he gave a message of surprising moderation for Francois Mitterrand: No, he said, we do not want to overthrow Goukouni; yes, the moment the authorities in Ndjamenas ask us, we will leave Chad. In short, he explained, there had been a misunderstanding.

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Qadhdhafi already knew since that same morning that French air force aircraft, DC-8 and Hercules C-130, were taking off from Bordeaux and Ajaccio, with their cargo compartments full of ammunition. Unloaded at the Garoua airport in Northern Cameroon, the cases were shipped by truck to Ndjamena while light arms, taken from the stocks of Kalashnikov assault rifles, stored at the French base at Bouar, in Central Africa, went in the same direction. Objective: To reinforce the Chadian ANI (Integrated National Army) which needed the items.

A rather motley assortment of diverse factions, the ANI, in 5 months of existence, as a matter of fact only managed to organize 200 men. Hardly enough to guard the Chagoua bridge. Tripoli decided to let things go. The decision to withdraw its troops probably had already been made.

Suddenly there was drama on Wednesday, 28 October. At least there was tragi-comedy. On Place de la Bourse, in Paris, at the headquarters taken over from the French Press Agency, somebody introduced a report which was quickly picked up by a journalist on a video screen and transmitted to the teletype of the newspapers. Quoting "witnesses coming from the Chadian capital," the message mentioned rumors of a coup d'etat, an airlift, a pro-Libyan column marching on Ndjamena, the disappearance of President Goukouni--in short, without saying so, a coup d'etat.

There was some panic among official circles; reading the message from Qadhdhafi to Mitterrand, it was thought that Libya had resigned itself to a retreat. But here there was another coup d'etat in progress. Published that same morning a weekly confidential bulletin, LA LETTRE D'AFRIQUE, also stated that there was a Libyan plan aimed at "legally replacing Goukouni with Acyl."

Now, the AFP [French Press Agency] dispatch to say the least was rather full of fantasy and on the next day was contradicted by a journalist who had been sent by that agency to Ndjamena. He never saw any coup d'etat, not even a failed attempt. But the information had the advantage of being credible and on 29 October several newspapers came out with their stories on the presumed coup d'etat on the front page.

Manipulation, intoxication, or disinformation? Yes. It remains for us to figure out who is behind it all. One can certainly accuse the French authorities of having orchestrated this campaign to exert pressure on Libya to speed up its retreat, especially since they themselves were wrong in the beginning regarding a situation which undoubtedly was less tense than indicated in the telegrams from Pierre Ricard. One might also think of a fantastic poker game between Paris and Tripoli with each side trying to bluff and, as the case may be, scare the other.

But there is a third assumption, strengthened by the brief and at least suspect "alert" of 1,200 paratroopers in Bouar on 28 October; large sectors of the French intelligence services--particularly the military ones--are hostile to the socialist administration who they hesitate to inform (we saw that at the time of the coup d'etat which overthrew David Dacko in Central Africa) and there are strong links in Paris with the Gaullist opposition. Their intent might very well have been to force the French administration to intervene once again directly in Chad in order to counter an imaginary but after all very imaginable coup d'etat. That would get Francois Mitterrand bogged down in the Chadian mess.

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On Wednesday, 29 October, at the end of a 5-hour cabinet meeting, Goukouni Weddeye officially demanded the total evacuation of all Libyan troops from Chad "before 31 December." Just 3 days later, Hisssein Habre, the rebel, announced the suspension of his guerrilla activities. And on 3 November Tripoli announced its retreat. Like the French in 1980. Was the French-African summit of Paris the summit of the rebirth of Chad?

Chad a Burden for Libya

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 p 15

[Article by Mohamed Selhami: "See Ndjamenia and Leave"]

[Text] "For us, Chad is of vital strategic interest. By helping it become stabilized, we will at the same time assure our own stability." This is how Colonel Qadhdhafi justified the intervention of the Libyan Army in Chad in December 1980. And speculations went along rather nicely: Was this a case of privileged cooperation between two neighboring countries or a real occupation? The Libyans always declared themselves ready to withdraw from Chad "if the government of Ndjamenia so demanded." Goukouni Weddeye wanted that and Qadhdhafi on 3 November decided to pull his troops back.

People in Tripoli undoubtedly were relieved and that included high officials who, without saying so, were hoping to divest themselves of the entire Chadian affair, for several reasons. First of all the economic difficulties caused by the drop in petroleum sales which the Jamahiriya tried to counteract through austerity (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1082). Certain development projects in the 1981-1985 5-year plan were suspended or even dropped; Libya floated a loan of \$200 million on the international market through the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company.

The Jamahiriya is beginning to be in financial trouble to the point where it is finding it difficult to pay the salaries of its officials. Chad became a burden which Libya was having trouble sustaining. Likewise, it can no longer spread its bounty to the numerous liberation movements in as generous a fashion as so far.

For the Libyans, withdrawing from Chad also means calmly preparing for the OAU summit which is to be held in June 1982 in Tripoli. Qadhdhafi knew that certain heads of African states--Egyptian, Sudanese, and Somali among others--would not agree to have him take over the chairmanship of their organization if he kept his army in Ndjamenia.

"The OAU summit will take place and our country will be honored to receive it and to preside over it." The high Libyan official who made this statement to us did not conceal his worry about the future of Chad which "risks another blowup." The Libyans do not care for that. For them it is enough that they are no longer challenged over the issue of Libyan ownership of the Aouzou strip, a region in which the army is now solidly established, building bases and barracks. With this ram-part, Chad is no longer of any "vital strategic interest." Why then stay there "except to become bogged down and make trouble for oneself."

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Libya cannot allow itself to make war outside its territory. It has neither the means for it--especially manpower--nor perhaps even the desire. Its soldiers certainly fought in the eastern part of Chad against the men of Hissein Habre, supported by the Sudan. A score of them died there. The Libyans would have preferred these "martyrs" to die in Palestine. "There, at least, we have a noble cause, our cause," we were told by a writer who added: "Since the union between Libya and Chad could not be accomplished."

Colonel Qadhdhafi felt that a number of his fellow citizens were tired of the Chadian mess. And, since he is their chief, he followed them! It seems that he took the first steps by sending Major Jallud to Ndjamena; he has the position of chief of government. He met president Goukouni on Wednesday, 28 October. He expressed the wish that the withdrawal should be made "in a gentle fashion" so as not to rub Qadhdhafi the wrong way and Goukouni played the game.

In the morning of 3 November, during the opening of the conference of the heads of state of France and Africa, there was only one watchword: No pressure on Libya, it will withdraw by itself. In the afternoon of the same day, Qadhdhafi dropped his political bomb: The announcement of the withdrawal of his troops.

Intervention Not Totally Negative

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 pp 16, 17

[Article by Amin Maalouf: "Controlled Skid in Chad"]

[Text] Just a few days ago it seemed that the Chadian affair would drag out indefinitely, like quite a few other crises throughout the world. But then quite abruptly, with a few dramatic moves, the situation was defused. A brilliant French-Chadian maneuver, a rapid and wise response from Tripoli, and the solution was there, before our unbelieving eyes.

At the center of this development above all there was the decision of one man. Until this summer, Colonel Qadhdhafi had maneuvered admirably well. The triumphal entry of his troops in Ndjamena in December 1980 may have irritated certain circles but was accomplished within the rules, in response to an appeal from the only internationally recognized Chadian authority.

Moreover, the behavior of the Libyan troops in the field had not given rise to any massive abuses which are generally connected with foreign armies. Relations with the "southerners" remained correct and the country's institutions, in spite of their frailty--or because of it?--were not too badly shaken. Moreover, the main resource in this long battle, that is to say, the French--this was during the administration of Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing--seemed to accept their defeat with a serenity which sometimes bordered on unawareness.

After his victory, the Libyan leader naturally wanted to strengthen his bonds with his "neighbor-protégé" in the south. Essentially, the agreement signed with president Goukouni Weddeye called for and still calls for a contribution to solving Chad's serious economic problems.

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In recent weeks however there has been a real turnabout. In the beginning, it was hardly perceptible. In the beginning, Goukouni gave the impression that he had a freer hand. He used this opportunity to try to counterbalance his special relations with Libya through a reconciliation with France. That was made possible when the socialists came to power in Paris. Since this troubling situation was known only in diplomatic circles, Qadhdhafi was able to pick one of the following solutions:

Either he himself could take the initiative and withdraw his troops from Chad, without waiting for anybody to ask him to do so--by encouraging their replacement with an inter-African force which Libya had never opposed and in which it of course would also have participated. He did not do that;

Or he could intervene even more directly in Chadian affairs and try to put his own liegeman in place at the time, foreign minister Acyl Ahmat, in order to proclaim Chadian-Libyan unity. The leader in Tripoli, perhaps not without reason, was suspected of wanting to do that but, in the end, he decided to uphold Chadian legality.

Between these two solutions there was a third one which was neither the wisest nor the most foolish: Wait for the dust to settle. That is the easiest solution for any leader and Qadhdhafi adopted it.

The result of this choice--or rather this non-choice--was to bring the problem of the Libyan presence in Chad out into the open. Goukouni went to Paris on 17 September and asked president Mitterrand for help. Not only in military and logistic terms, which would change nothing in the balance of forces out in the field, but also and above all in political and diplomatic terms, as we saw several weeks later. For the Chadian leader, that was more important because the publicity made around his semi-rupture with Tripoli is a form of protection. The turning point was reached in 3 days. And while the observer might use the term "admirable" in referring to the maneuver that enabled the Libyan troops to enter Ndjamen in December 1980, the same adjective is not too strong to describe the French-Chadian maneuver on 28-30 October 1981.

First of all, there was "fool's day," when everybody was made to believe that Qadhdhafi was trying to overthrow the legitimate government in Ndjamen and that Goukouni had disappeared, while the Libyan number two man, Major Jallud, was talking naively with Goukouni himself. Then, protected by the noise created in this fashion, the Chadian leader dared take the decisive and almost irreversible step: He solemnly demanded the withdrawal of the Libyan troops.

For the sake of completeness we must add that this "controlled skid" took place behind the smokescreen made up of the debate on the inter-African force. Tripoli undoubtedly thought that the diplomatic discussion on this subject would drag on for several weeks, perhaps even until the OAU summit in June 1982, whereas the big show had been carefully prepared for the end of this October.

The undeniable success of the maneuver, on the eve of the French-African summit, had created an entirely new situation. Before that, a coup d'etat against Goukouni could have had a semblance of justification, regardless how disastrous the consequences of that may have been in long-range terms. After the "days of October," a coup d'etat would have been nothing but a suicidal plunge. The chairmanship of

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the OAU, which Qadhdhafi wants very much, would undoubtedly have eluded him. Even more seriously, the United States, which does not conceal its militant hostility toward the Libyan leader, would have had a golden opportunity to get him bogged down in the sand of Chad once and for all. And the French would have been obligated to participate in such an operation.

Did Tripoli envisage this option? There is little likelihood of that. Libyan officials at no time went beyond the point of no return, even when their actions had a cover of legitimacy.

Another attitude which had become untenable was the wait-and-see attitude. That could have been justified before the whole thing came out into the open. After Goukouni's demand for withdrawal, Libya could no longer stand by and wait because it had been put in the position of the accused and because the pressure exerted against it could only grow day after day. The stronger the pressure, the less conciliatory could Tripoli's decision be because any conciliation would have looked like a defeat.

The only reasonable development was for the Libyan leader to make the best of a bad situation and without ambiguity to announce his intention to withdraw--he never said that he would not--and that he would take cognizance of the withdrawal requests from the Chadian government and that, like the French a year ago, he would disengage even faster than Goukouni wanted.

By making the "good choice," Qadhdhafi saved the essential aspects of the whole situation. While the disengagement took place without any big show, the bottom line after the Libyan intervention was not entirely negative. There was a certain stabilization and the civil war did no longer rage in the capital.

But let us forget the past even if it is quite recent because what is even more important in current developments is the acceleration of events. Day after day, hour after hour, the Chadian situation is changing and if that solves certain problems, it also creates others. The inter-African force will have to be assembled, not in a few weeks, but in a few days. It would be disastrous not to fill the vacuum left by the departure of the Libyans without delay. And national reconciliation must be accomplished briskly if one wishes to keep the specter of civil war away once and for all. Let us repeat: The Chadian affair was never as close to a solution, the principal interested parties never proved to be as wise, the antagonisms never seemed as surmountable. And never before have we seen the light at the end of the tunnel this close. Is this a mirage?

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. CHAD

DEFENSE, FOREIGN MINISTERS ON CURRENT SITUATION

PM271043 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Nov 81 pp 70-71

[Patrick Forestier, Bendit Gysembergh report: "The Libyans Are Burning Any hing They Cannot Take Home"]

[Excerpt] Mr Adoum Togoi is now Chad defense minister. This brilliant man, a skilled tactician, lost a leg during the civil war. He is regarded as President Goukouni's eminence grise and has been the strong man of Chad since the Libyans' departure. He still leads the popular forces, which are loyal to the head of state and have not yet been integrated into the national army. These partisan units were severely affected by the war, and it is not unusual to see in their ranks youths aged 14 or 15 armed with kalashnikovs. In the ravaged country it is still the armed groups which are able to feed their men best. The defense minister also directs the military police and the integrated national army, which at present only has three battallions of 1,200 men and one in the process of formation. The rest of the Chad armed forces (12,000 men under Colonel Kamougue's command) refuse to go and fight Hissein Habre's supporters in the East. In face of this complex situation in the lawful armed forces, the number of fighters under the banners of the various faction leaders is estimated to be 30,000. "We are having difficulties in training our army," Adoum Togoi explained to me, "mainly because of lack of equipment. If the inter-African force, which I prefer to describe as a peace-keeping rather than a neutral force, were willing to give us its equipment, we would be able to put down Hissein Habre's rebellion."

After a few days of calm Hissein Habre's forces have in fact resumed fighting in Eastern Chad. The cities of Guereda, Iriba and Adre have apparently fallen into their hands. "The Libyans' departure is forcing us to rethink our logistics entirely," Togoi willingly confided.

Foreign Minister Acyl Ahmat, who is regarded as pro-Libyan, is now under the greatest threat. It is his troops, those of the revolutionary democratic council, which have been fighting Hissein Habre in the east for almost a year. Now that the Libyans have gone they are more exposed than anybody.

After a short visit to Paris Mr Acyl Ahmat chose to return to Ndjamen. He is sick and rarely leaves his villa on the banks of the Chari, which is guarded by two Toyotas armed with Stalin organs and positioned in his garden. He received me wearing a neck support which made it difficult for him to speak. In addition to a

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spinal problem he is suffering from a stomach ulcer. "I am a Chadian, not a Libyan," he told me. "I want the Libyans to go, but not so abruptly. I obey the head of state but I think that we have taken an unwise decision. Before asking the Libyans to withdraw we should have obtained assurances from Egypt and Sudan that they would stop helping Hissein Habre. Since we have no equipment and are waiting for aid which is a long time in coming, we are now in a difficult situation, as far as France is concerned, I hope that it will play its role in Chad fully. I have been accused of being anti-French. This is not true. I was raised by a Frenchman. From 1964 to 1968 I was a student at the Bordeaux Infantry School and the Marseilles Naval School. At that time there was even some talk of my taking French nationality."

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CONGO

WAYS FRANCE CAN AID NATION FACE SUDDEN OIL WEALTH NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 pp 2800-2802, 2803

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Brazzaville: How To Master an Oil Economy"]

[Excerpt] What the Congolese president's official visit to Francois Mitterrand in July 1981 undoubtedly brought about in relations between the two countries was a total relaxation of tension, whose effects were visible only recently at meetings of the French-Congolese commission. Jean-Pierre Cot was anxious to participate in the meetings himself at the head of the French delegation, thereby gaining an opportunity to better define the scope of the previously mentioned affinities [ideological] concerning the "self-centered" development of the People's Republic of the Congo and the aid that France can offer in the undertaking.

One dare not forget, however, that the Congo's cooperation with France on the governmental level was accompanied, well before 10 May, by parallel relations with the French private sector. At the time of his last visit, President Sassou Nguesso himself was the guest of French employers and management. On 24 September, a Congolese delegation, made up of Pierre Moussa, minister of planning, Minister of Industry Itady and Minister of Mines and Energy Adada, was received at the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] by 250 executives and private meetings with a number of them were subsequently held.

Several prominent French businessmen then went to Brazzaville and a delegation of French industrialists, led by the CNPF, will go to Brazzaville in the early months of 1982. The companies represented have no local base and constitute a new and receptive milieu for operations that will be proposed to them, operations that are a part of the 1982-1986 Five-Year Plan, advance notice of which was given to the CNPF by Moussa in the form of a list of priority projects (see MARCHES TROPICAUX of 25 September, p 2452, and 2 October, p 2510).

This direct appeal to French capital and technology demonstrates, first of all, the realism of the Congolese leaders, who have understood that one of the greatest merits of "official" cooperation is to provide a favorable milieu for private cooperation, outside of which it remains formal and incomplete. But the fact that the move comes at a time of economic recovery for the Congo, giving its leaders real latitude in the choice of partners, constitutes a pledge of confidence to which they are all the more sensitive because it promotes their interests.

¹ Formula familiar to the minister of cooperation and to President Sassou Nguesso.

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Financial Situation

In a world in crisis, only oil could bring about this recovery, just as it is indirectly responsible for the mess that preceded it. Not only did the overestimation of national oil prospects in 1972 cause the reduction in investments under the 1976-1978 Plan, while public spending increased dangerously, but it delayed the working of deposits that that are now the most productive, at a very time when a decline in or disappearance of other mineral resources such as potash began to occur.

Oil production fortunately began to rise again in 1978, after the low point of 1977 with its total tonnage of 1.8 million. For the time being, it is the task of two companies: ELF-Congo [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and AGIP-Congo [Italian Petroleum Enterprise], both of which have a 20-percent share of the capital. Along with the Congolese Government, they carry out research and operations. Dividends -- the first will be paid in 1981 -- are based on the proportion of investments after taxes are deducted. Except for the small land deposit of Pointe-Indienne, whose 10,000 tons are now only of symbolic value and which is ELF-Congo's exclusive province, extraction is done in partnership with the two companies (65 percent ELF and 35 percent AGIP). AGIP is an operator only for Loango, where the percentages are reversed. Everywhere elsewhere, for Emeraude, Likouala, Yanga and, beginning in 1982, Senji, responsibility for extraction belongs to ELF. Overall Congolese production rose to 4 million tons in 1981, compared with 2.4 million in 1978, 2.7 million in 1979 and 3.5 million in 1980. Progress registered at Kilouala and Yanga and the entry into production of Senji allow one to figure 5 million tons in 1982 and from 8 to 9 million tons in 1985.

Growth of Oil Production in the Congo (in 1,000 tons)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount</u>	
1965	70.9	Pointe-Indienne deposit only
1970	19	Pointe-Indienne deposit only
1971	14	Pointe-Indienne deposit only
1972	335	15 Pointe-Indienne; 320 Emeraude
1973	2,049	8 Pointe-Indienne; 2,041 Emeraude
1974	2,454	13 Pointe-Indienne; 2,441 Emeraude
1975	1,789	13 Pointe-Indienne; 1,776 Emeraude
1976	2,001	12 Pointe-Indienne; 1,989 Emeraude
1977	1,801	13 Pointe-Indienne; 1,636 Emeraude; 152 Loango
1978	2,430	11 Pointe-Indienne; 1,427 Emeraude; 992 Loango
1979	2,751	10 Pointe-Indienne; 1,417 Emeraude; 1,324 Loango
1980	3,310	10 Pointe-Indienne; 1,300 Emeraude; 1,400 Loango; 600 Likouala
1981	3,910	10 Pointe-Indienne; 1,200 Emeraude; 1,300 Loango; 1,100 Likouala; 300 Yanga

These are figures that are very nearly definitive. An increase in them could result only from new discoveries, which would still be balanced by the gradual exhaustion of deposits after several years of working. In the Congo, techniques involving the

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injection of steam: steam drive or puff and roof, have not yet gone beyond the experimental stage. It is certain that at deposits such as Emeraude, where operating conditions do not permit the recovery of over 8 percent of the known reserves, their application would be of the greatest interest.

Another cause for optimism is the development of land and offshore research which, although there are not yet any positive results, have the aid of American, Canadian, Brazilian and Swiss companies on the basis of sharing production with the government.

Within about two years, oil production will be joined by gas production. Reserves are now estimated at some 50 billion cubic meters. A company has been set up by the government and the two operators in order to complete the inventory of resources in this domain. If conclusions are positive, work could lead to the construction, as early as 1982, of a liquefaction plant with an annual capacity of 6 million cubic meters.

Consequently, hydrocarbons represent the backbone of Congolese development, as the rising dollar solidifies the compensation of oil contracts month after month. Already helped by the consolidation in 1980 of the Congo's debts, the financial situation shows a foreign debt of 265 billion CFA francs, service on which represented some 20 percent of budget receipts in 1981 and 28 percent of all export receipts, which sets the ratio at a rather high level. Moreover, the internal debt amounts to 225 billion CFA francs and its payment does pose problems for enterprise treasuries.

On the whole, however, and despite inflation of about 15 percent, linked to a 40-percent rate of monetary expansion and a 17-percent growth in the volume of short-term loans, the economic situation is quite satisfactory: a surplus in the trade balance and balance of payments, a substantial increase in foreign assets; a gross national product that rose 30 percent between 1977 and 1980. While the share of oil receipts in the overall budget (70 percent in 1981 compared with 41 percent in 1979) does express a structural imbalance common to all economies of this type, their stability now seems beyond question. At any rate, they enable the government to redeem substantial public savings (20 percent of the 1981 budget) and to meet its foreign debt commitments. The Congo will have no difficulty in gaining aid on the international financial market. The danger would lie in letting itself be carried too far by such ease.

Self-Centered Development

Meeting the prime needs of the people, defined by their nature and volume rather than value, takes precedence here, as a strategy, over the search for industrial and commercial profits, for which the climate, soil and geographic features would supply the means, and constitutes one of the simplest definitions of this type of development. In fact, the volume of oil extracted turns the terms of the proposition around in the Congo. Priority needs remain to be defined, but they tend to be met only by revenue derived from such extraction.

A few years ago, then Minister of Finance Lopes identified these prime needs as those that would be met by agriculture primarily based on food crops, the goal being to lead the Congo, thanks to its oil income, to an "after-oil" period characterized by self-sufficiency. Agriculture still holds a place of honor in the

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1982-1986 Plan, although the absence of figures for the projects does not yet allow one to judge its precise role. It justifies a large percentage of the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] program, estimates for the fifth EDF [European Development Fund] program and a loan of 2.16 billion CFA francs from the African Development Bank. However, one observes a certain slippage of projects, from production to consumption and from primary to construction, transport and services. The government is led into this by political considerations. It is a question of making the equipping of the territory uniform so as to quell regional and ethnic rivalries that since independence have contributed to the instability of national life. The entire population must be interested in improving the standard of living, affecting interest in work, technical training and creative initiative.

As a result, Sassou Nguesso undertook an experiment in May of which few African chiefs of state can boast: a 24-day survey, village to village, on foot, accompanied by the ministers of agriculture, health and social affairs. He returned from it convinced that meeting prime needs can be obtained only through agriculture, even if based on food crops, but a true takeoff, including in this production sector, is linked to what we call quality of life, whence the importance attached to often neglected accomplishments: housing, naturally, but rural roads as well, telephone booths, out-patient clinics and ambulances within reach of the peasants. Opening up the interior and the completion of building materials units will therefore have a choice place among the projects presented to French investors. For example, a village-center project was submitted to the French delegation at the meeting of the joint commission. It did not have the objectives of the Tanzanian ujamaa but permitted a certain economy of means for the realization of this basic equipment.

Whether or not this is related to the current underequipment, a certain decline in private farming is perceptible. In two years, coffee production fell from 4,800 to 2,800 tons and cacao production from 2,600 to 2,100 tons. Niari sugar has experienced difficulties of which we shall speak later. The deterioration of the soil because of a lack of fertilizer, the inadequate sanitary treatment and the aging of the plantations are not enough to explain the phenomenon, while the other economic sectors, activated by oil production, are expanding. Wood, especially okoume, was hard hit by the crisis. From 1979 to 1980, production rose again from 470,000 to 800,000 cubic meters. The new areas worked in Sangha and Likouala permit one to anticipate regular growth. Afforestation using eucalyptus and limba around Pointe-Noire (project submitted to the FAC), leading to a 240,000-ton paper mill, should reinforce this.

Despite management errors compromising the profitability of national companies, industry since 1978 has experienced a boom comparable in volume and turnover: 80 percent for food, 43 percent for metals, 21 percent for textiles and 48 percent for chemical industries. Transportation also reflects this resumption of activity. The traffic of the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO) totaled 1.3 million tons of goods (537 million tons/kilometer) in 1980, compared with 1.1 million tons (463 million tons/kilometer) in 1979, not including the tonnage of manganese ore hauled for the Ogooue Mining Company. The railroad's receipts were 15 billion CFA francs in 1980, compared with 11.8 billion in 1979.

And yet, it is not easy to point out the economic sectors for which "self-centered" development has resulted in preferential financial efforts, considering the penchant of the large credit organizations for certain types of investments, such as

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transportation infrastructures, and the considerable funds they mobilize. Two major operations absorbed most of the foreign aid during the last two fiscal years. French aid itself, which, with 230 million French francs in 1980, made up nearly 50 percent of the entire amount, did not escape that failing, whether it be a question of the FAC or loans from the Central Fund. Realignment of the CFCO track in the mountainous region of Mayombe, initially estimated to cost 33 billion CFA francs, will now cost 60 billion, almost all furnished by foreign subsidies or loans. The FAC share will exceed 5 billion. That of the EDF, which was already 4.9 billion, must be increased in 1982 by 1.6 billion under regional projects. Continuing an effort begun in 1980, the Central Fund in 1981 granted the Trans-Congolese Communications Agency (ATC) a loan of 98 million French francs, including 20 million on the second platform barrier, for the purchase of railroad equipment, training of CFCO personnel and maintenance equipment at the Pointe-Noire port.

Adaptation of the Brazzaville runway, already lengthened in 1950, 1952 and 1961, to accommodate Boeing 747's, will cost 23 billion CFA francs, including 5.1 billion to be borne by the Congolese Government, 2.5 billion by BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development], 2.3 billion by the African Development Bank, 1.23 billion by the BDEAC [Development Bank of the Central African States] and 1.26 billion by the FAC, which will finance in particular the supervision of work, for which a notification of prequalification was issued in the spring of 1981. Here again, it is a question of an operation that is certainly indispensable, but which nevertheless diverts available investment funds from basic activities.

Industrial Structures

The nationalized companies in the industrial sector were designed within the dimensional and technical framework of the old AEF [French Equatorial Africa], which the rate unification measures of the UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa] have not adequately replaced. The flaws of poor management, plethoric personnel and the lack of capital have often been added to the morass born of an unfavorable world situation.

The Congolese authorities are all the more aware of this situation because it has forced them to make for the rehabilitation of these companies considerable financial sacrifices which, for the 1976-1979 period, exceed 8 billion CFA francs, not including support and participations distributed by virtue of a 11-billion-franc loan from foreign banks. Discharging the debts of SUCO [expansion unknown], the sugar branch of the old SIAN [Congolese Agro-Industrial Company] and SOSUNIARI [Niari Sugar Company], which were nationalized in 1970, amounted to 5 billion francs, without mentioning the sugar subsidies granted in 1979, 1980 and 1981, for an approximate total of 4.5 billion.

The SUCO affair is characteristic of the Congolese Government's reaction to a deterioration that seemed hopeless. At the time of the nationalization of SIAN-SOSUNIARI, the firm was producing 100,000 tons of sugar with a capacity of 135,000 tons, which remained theoretical only because world prices (1.5¢ a pound Pointe-Noire) did not encourage production. This result was obtained under remarkable technical conditions within a period of about 13 years and for very modest investments (1.36 billion CFA francs for the SOSUNIARI plant, which could handle 5,000 tons of cane a day), when compared with similar operations in other African countries. The subsequent recovery of sugar prices, up to \$1.00 a kilogram, should

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have brought the Congolese Government, the new owner of the plants, substantial profits. Nothing of the sort occurred because sugar production gradually fell from 100,000 to 4,000 tons in 1979, when it approached absolute zero because of a lack of cane, cutters, trucks and credits.

Since 1979, the technical takeover by SIGAS [expansion unknown], a branch of SOMDIAA [expansion unknown] and of HVA Holland, should make it possible to rescue the old SOSUNIARI plant, the refinery, the plantations and normalize production. Services of SIGAS are linked to indemnification of the former shareholders at 44 percent of the face value of the securities, without reappraisal, with the deadline set for June 1982. The Congo regularly honors its deadlines. The multinational financing of the operation totals 10.7 billion CFA francs, including 3.6 billion for the Central Fund and the COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] cover acquired for 1.2 billion. The plant's share of the total is 6 billion, while that of the refinery is 266 million. By 1980-1981, production had risen to 18,000 tons. The figure of 70,000 tons will be reached by 1985-1986, barring unforeseen difficulties. A new era, that of diversification, will then begin for Niari, and the city of Nkayi, with 40,000 inhabitants, will have become the country's third largest.

It is significant of the receptiveness of the Congolese worker to technical competence that these results were obtained with expatriate personnel limited to five technicians. At the request of some co-investors, the number will probably be increased to ten units, which would permit the computerization of the enterprise and better use of equipment.

Dogma and Facts

In these columns, we have too frequently brought out the apparent contradiction between the ideological and diplomatic choices of the Marxist-Leninist African nations and their appeal to the liberal West for technical, financial and economic help for there to be any need to mention it again. Indeed, President Sassou Nguesso did not fail to emphasize that the aid agreement that he went to Moscow to sign in the spring involved no military provisions. However, he worried about the presence of French detachments in the Central African Republic and Gabon (total of 2,200 men) and expressed the wish that "vice" would soon be loosened. It is hoped that the "change in the political landscape" in France will help make him realize that that vice is not directed at the Congo or his own regime. As for the other positions of the Congo: nonalignment, the Sahara, Afghanistan, and so on, they concern only the Congo. Moreover, it would appear that they obey a logic of which we often have but an imperfect understanding, whether it be a question of domestic or foreign policy.

Economically speaking, the attitude of the Congo is affected by two factors: first of all, the socialist path to development and the difficulties it encounters in the search for capital and technology; and second, its self-centered nature, which is sometimes scarcely compatible with the volume of oil revenue.

It may seem surprising that countries with meager financial resources, lacking in mechanisms for the formation of capital and whose technology is still rudimentary, would claim to follow a philosophy of history that views socialism as the inevitable outcome of the supercapitalization and superindustrialization of Western societies.

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One cannot therefore criticize the Congo for soliciting foreign investors, to which even the USSR still resorts, or for going to the United States or Europe for technological help that the homeland of socialism does not scorn either! Experience has shown the Congo that capital and technology are necessary for development, although neither is adequate alone. Oil wealth cannot do it alone.

Concerning structures permitting the utilization of both elements, the condemnation by the People's Republic, of a certain number of these national companies responsible for 60 percent of the public debt, the reconsideration of a second category and the extension of a third are simply in keeping with good sense and stem from a state of mind common to most African countries. Between the exclusive private ownership envisaged in the Ivory Coast -- and which is not excluded in the Congo -- and integral socialism, all forms of joint venture are possible. The origin of capital, now almost totally from banks, constitutes their common measure. Moreover, it was quite unjust for certain milieus to criticize the so-called selfish and defeatist preference of the French industrialists in Africa for engineering and management contracts, at the expense of investment in capital. Among many others, the example of SUCO shows that the industrialist generally has no choice. Furthermore, it is perfectly normal and even desirable for its technological contributions to be remunerated in the same way as its funds.

There remains self-centered capital. It expresses the fairly exigent awareness that governments have of the deep-lying interests of their people. What is to be feared in the Congo is that the effects of the oil revenue may be all the more restrictive as the ratio of production-population rises and that they move in a direction diametrically opposed to that of its interests. Except in the case of tyrannical totalitarianism, the growth in national income in our time must be reflected in the standard of living. Reserving profits for meeting priority needs requires long-term planning, in any case. What is to be done with that influx of money, given the limited local possibilities for its use, other than devote it to consumption or activities whose added value is less than the amount of imports they require, thereby compromising future opportunities? Outside pressures in this area rarely work in the right direction. If one excludes certain actions by the FAC, the EDF, the African Development Bank or the UNDP, one notes with regret that nearly all loans of bilateral or international origin given to the Congo, for activities ranging from the hotel trade to textiles, are linked to the most questionable secondary and sometimes even tertiary sector.

At the time of his Paris trip, President Sassou Nguesso included among the justifications for his journey his desire to restore balanced commercial trade with France. France does in fact supply the Congo with 50 percent of its imports, but buys only about 7 billion CFA francs worth of goods from it. It is only in 19th place among France's African suppliers. Actually, while France benefits commercially from this movement, the deficit is made up for the Congo by the sale of oil abroad by a company that is 80 percent French. Nor can one forget the annual budget of 20 billion CFA francs that ELF-Congo devotes to research. Investments in the Yanga and Senji deposits alone represented nearly 250 billion CFA francs.

The real problem in French-Angolan relations lies elsewhere. A restored commercial balance is definitely desirable. if the substance for it can be found. but it is by helping the Congo to break the fatal nature of spiraling consumption and by concretely encouraging primary activities or secondary activities with a primary

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base such as agriculture for food, foreseeing a reduction in oil production within 15 to 20 years, that France can best prove its loyalty to the Congo as it faces the difficult test which a sudden influx of wealth could impose on it.

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GUINEA

NEW AGREEMENT GIVES IMPETUS TO IRON ORE PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 pp 2819-2820

[Excerpts] Ismael Toure, Guinean minister of mines and geology and chairman of the board of directors of the Iron-Mining Company of Guinea for Development of the Nimba Range (MIFERGUI-Nimba), has just announced the conclusion of an agreement with the United States Steel Corporation, according to whose terms two subsidiaries of the latter will be entrusted with management and operations tasks, on the one hand, and with engineering for the MIFERGUI-Nimba project.

The agreement, signed in Paris on 16 October 1981 following a week of negotiations, also provides for the entry of U. S. Steel into the ranks of shareholders in the MIFERGUI-Nimba firm. The agreement governs the basic principles as well as most of the elements of cooperation between U. S. Steel and MIFERGUI-Nimba.

"We have just completed a very important phase in the development of our country's mining industry," the minister said. "The quality of our ore is recognized all over the world, but the distance from the location of the Nimba Range constitutes a technical challenge for working of the deposit. Such working requires substantial financial means amounting to several hundred million dollars and the confidence of the backers will be complete only if the management of the project is entrusted to an enterprise with internationally recognized technical capabilities and fame. We have found that company in U.S. Steel."

The Nimba Range deposit, divided by the border between Liberia and Guinea, was worked for some 20 years on the Liberian side, where it was a major source of income for the Liberian Government. Experts from the Guinean Government have evaluated the deposit of the Guinean side and believe it contains at least 300 million tons of ore. However, it has never been worked.

"Several years of studies and preparation have brought us to this phase of completing the project," Minister Toure said. "Guinea wishes to recognize the constant confidence shown by its partners in MIFERGUI-Nimba."

Along with the Guinean Government, which holds 50 percent of the stock, MIFERGUI-Nimba also has shareholders from Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Spain, Yugoslavia, Roman Romania, Japan, France and Liberia, and now, with the support of U.S. Steel, the United States, all brought together in a syndicate with headquarters in Paris.

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"Guinea is proud to be able to provide this unique example of international cooperation, which brings together countries of all views from four continents," Minister Ismael Toure said. "Our shareholders are present, our market is there, and now, our technical capabilities are assured with the intervention of U. S. Steel. We shall now have confidence of backers that will equal that of our partners, which will enable us to envisage the completion of this very important project by 1982."

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

ADF FOOD ASSISTANCE--Guinea-Bissau is going to begin a livestock raising project to improve the country's food situation. The project will be in the Bissau suburb and the eastern region of the country. Costing \$5 million and 87-percent financed by the African Development Fund and 13-percent by the Guinean Government, the project involves the establishment of a production center for 32,000 layers and 455,000 dozen eggs a year and 37 tons of fryers. It also includes the construction of three swine-raising units in the eastern region of the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2755] [COPY-RIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

FISHING CATCH STILL INSUFFICIENT--The Ivory Coast's fishing sector will have a production of 88,000 tons in 1980, an increase over the preceding year (12.5 billion CFA francs in total turnover, compared with 10.6 billion in 1979), according to the latest bulletin from the Chamber of Industry in Abidjan. Despite this growth, the deficit remains large, with an estimated consumption of 184,000 in 1980. Efforts are therefore underway, mainly the application of a program to modernize cottage fishing and to build modern infrastructures. The French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) and the UN Development Fund (UNDP) are also giving aid to projects to develop lagoon aquiculture with the creation or expansion of fish hatcheries and the organization of continental fish farming in departments in the central region of the country. The Ivorian fleet is now made up of 25 trawlers, 21 sardine fishing boats and 10 tuna boats. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1878, 6 Nov 81 p 2820] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

EXPERTS MEET MALAGASY OFFICIALS--Antananarivo, 30 Nov (REUTER)--Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka today met a group of Libyan experts led by Planning Secretary Musa Ahmad Abu Furaywah to discuss possible Libyan financial aid to the island republic, informed sources said. The Malagasy leader visited Tripoli two months ago to sign cooperation agreements running up to November next year. Under the agreements Libya may take part in an ambitious agricultural project worth 200 million U.S. dollars, the president said. The accords also provide for the setting up of a joint Libyan-Malagasy companies in unspecified fields and Libya is to provide expertise in oil exploration and exploitation, the sources said. The sources also said a North Korean military mission led by General Baik Mak Rim, whose arrival here 5 days ago went unannounced, met Malagasy defence and foreign affairs ministers today. No details were available on the talks. North Korea, which maintains some 400 military experts here, provided arms to Madagascar, and helped train the country's presidential guard. The North Koreans last year lent Madagascar several Russian-built MIG-17 fighter planes, they added. [Text] [JN302051 London REUTER in English 2024 GMT 30 Nov 81]

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

SWEDISH WHEAT, ITALIAN TRUCKS--At the beginning of October, a load of wheat from Sweden arrived in Maputo, a gift from the government in Stockholm aimed at minimizing the effects of the drought that has affected part of Mozambique. For its part, the Italian Government has offered Mozambique 80 Fiat trucks, within the framework of the program to fight famine in Africa. In addition to this gift, worth \$2.5 million, is a sum of \$850,000 for the purchase of spare parts. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 p 2779] . [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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SENEGAL

OPPOSITION LEADER PLAYS DOWN PARTY SPLIT

PM300941 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 9-22 Nov 81 pp 28-30

[Ginette Cot report: "Mamadou Dia's Self-management Plan" date and place of Dia interview not specified]

[Excerpt] The [Senegalese] People's Democrat Movement [MDP] of which Mamadou Dia is temporary national coordinator (pending the party's constituent congress scheduled for the end of this year or the beginning of next year) saw the resignation of nine prominent members on 12 August, only 3 months after its foundation. They included several of the former prime minister's close comrades in arms during the independence period, such as former Interior Minister Valdiodio Ndiaye, who was also in prison with Mamadou Dia.

This blow, which immediately aroused much speculation and made people wonder about the new party's chances of survival, was primarily a sign of the existence of a general phenomenon of instability, change and regrouping--a phenomenon which seeks unlikely to spare any opposition political party--after the change of Senegalese head of state and of government party (the Socialist Party [PS]) since 1 January.

In any event these defections in no way reduced Mamadou Dia's confidence, courage and tenacity. Of course, he did not conceal the fact that "it was a harsh blow from the sentimental viewpoint." But he told me that he considers the incidents minor in political terms. "Of the nine people who resigned," he pointed out, "six belonged to the National College of Mwadows (elders)--a structure found at all levels of the party in which the older people make their moral and political contribution and pass on their advice and experiences to the younger people who actually have the responsibility and are active in the movement's practical life. "Only three of those who left were members of the national directorate, that is not many," Mamadou Dia added. "When you realize that some of our comrades who resigned were advocating all alliance with Abdou Diouf, you understand that their departure clarified the party's political situation. The disagreement was too great, and we will now be able to work in complete security. If the Socialist Party had been able to take away the MDP's real brain trust it would have been a victory for the government party. But in the circumstances it is more of a failure."

Indeed, according to Mamadou Dia the PS "is socialist only in name." "And," he added, "aside from political pluralism, which the new head of state was forced to

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restore and which is a victory for the patriotic forces. We see nothing really positive in President Abdou Diouf's action. According to our analysis of the situation, there is nothing which could permit us to give preference to an alliance with a party which is responsible for our country's disastrous situation."

Mamadou Dia does not think that President Abdou Diouf has the means of implementing his policy, either through his statements of intent, or measures taken to improve the running of public affairs or the struggle against the acquisition of illicit wealth or the democratization of the Socialist Party. "That is why," he said, "the patriotic opposition must unite more than ever. And despite the problems I am optimistic in this respect."

For Mamadou Dia, "the doctrine of self-managing socialism is a more elaborate and truly democratic form of socialism. It corresponds to African traditions, which are not based on individualist attitudes as in the West but on solidarity and mutual aid within the country."

Moreover it is the ideas which formed the basis for the first development plan drawn up in 1960 under then Prime Minister Mamdou Dia--to make the basic rural communities the levers of economic and social development--which are behind the MDP's doctrine and approach. "The self-management plan can obviously not be implemented overnight," Mamadou Dia commented. "But in the rural zones it is already possible to make a start with the development of the cooperative movement--a movement which was first shelved then started again, but not until it had been emptied of its original content. The cooperative movement can only succeed if it remains autonomous. As was seen with the national office of cooperation and assistance for development, if it is crushed under bureaucratic structures it proves a resounding failure. It is also possible to consider extending the cooperative movement to other sectors. For instance, it is possible to form communities of traders or even communities of tenants to administer accommodations. A phase of joint administration by owners and workers in some industrial spheres can also be envisaged." But those are preparatory and transitional measures. Mamadou Dia thinks it quite clear that to promote the society of which the MDP dreams, in which only the strategic sectors would escape self-management and be under exclusive state control--"we must start with a grand clearout, a radical transformation of institutions and structures." That is why, in the first part of its program, albeit "casting them in its own mould" and updating them, the MDP accepts the broad outlines of the United Senegalese Opposition Coordination Program, of which the self-managing socialists were joint authors and "which aims at the victory of the democratic and popular national revolution--the precondition for the installation of a democratic and popular state which is its ultimate objective."

"Attaining real independence on the political, economic and cultural planes and imposing a new context of real democratic and popular change are essential preconditions for the attainment of our whole plan for self-managing socialism," Mamadou Dia said. "This therefore determines our alliance strategy. If we want to attain our objectives we must unite with those who support the program of the democratic and popular national revolution. Moreover that was the subject of our disagreement with our comrades who resigned and who wanted to form an alliance with the Socialist Party on an ideological basis...."

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

MAURITANIAN RELATIONS--A long talk was held in Paris by the Senegalese Abdou Diouf and the Mauritanian Khouna Ould Haidalla. To "ease" the very strained atmosphere recently. The frontier between the two countries was even closed 21-29 October at the initiative of Nouakchott. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 p 24] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981]

WADE SEEKS DIOUF'S MEDIATION--Abdoulaye Wade went to the Hotel Crillon where he was received by some chiefs of state. Hoping to obtain some mediation on his behalf from President Abdou Diouf, it was whispered here and there in the corridors about the secretary general of the Senegalese Democratic Party [PDS]. The invariable reply of the presidential entourage: the matter is in the hands of the law. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1088, 11 Nov 81 p 24] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981]

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SIERRA LEONE

POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR GOVERNMENT UPHEAVAL SEEN

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 16 Nov 81 p 17

[Article by Brendan Nicholson: "Change Again for Sierra Leone?"]

[Text] FREETOWN—Luxury German cars and the rusty corrugated iron buildings against which they contrast so sharply have become twin symbols of Sierra Leone.

In fact, they have displaced even the massive cotton tree which provided shade for the former slaves who established Freetown and which still dominates the city centre.

In the hopeful years gone by the cotton tree symbolised the strength of the land and the shelter it could provide for its inhabitants.

No one doubts that the former British colony can still support its people. There is fertile soil and gold and diamonds aplenty. Even "encouraging preliminary indications" of oil deposits.

DEJECTION

But there is also, an air of dejection.

The land has yielded up fortunes before and

they have frequently disappeared into the pockets of foreign accounts of a few.

Who is to say things will be any different when mining of diamonds in kimberlite deposits begins next year or if exploitation of a huge gold reef begins as scheduled in 1984.

Last year Sierra Leone officially exported about 480 000 carats of diamonds, most of them good quality gems, which provided nearly half the country's export earnings.

It is generally accepted that roughly the same amount again was smuggled out of the country.

The value of these smuggled jewels is not necessarily lost to the country. Much of it comes back in the shape of imports ranging from stereophonic equipment to cars.

So bad has influence peddling and bribery become that some foreign businessmen, "encumbered" by their own country's legislation against corrupt

practices, say it is almost impossible to do business in Sierra Leone legally.

It is not uncommon for junior officials to simply withhold their services until suitably rewarded.

Another problem for those who might otherwise be induced to set up businesses in Sierra Leone is that they are likely to be robbed out of business by employees or outsiders who can easily have goods "fenced" by the hundreds of street vendors.

Foreign observers put the level of corruption down to low wages, soaring living costs, high unemployment and the pressures of obligations to extended families.

When trade unionists called a general strike in August to protest about profiteering and low standards in the medical and transport services only President Siaka Stevens seemed surprised.

He agreed that 70 cents was too much to pay for a 14 cent cup

of rice and ordered that the price be controlled at the lower level. Within a week traders immediately began hoarding to push up the price which, within a week, was back to 70 cents.

The President also detained 179 unionists for a month and the bottom dropped out of the strike.

The officials were released only after a wave of rioting and looting had ended with at least nine people dead.

On that occasion the civil unrest was promptly crushed but even relatively conservative young professional men in Sierra Leone believe more trouble is coming.

The need for change is one of the subjects most discussed, amid frequent over-the-shoulder glances, in the bars of Freetown.

They say the tension is there. All that is needed to set the spark is a personality, a Master-Sergeant Doe or a Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings.

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